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1 Introduction
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was
established by Article 12 of theKyoto Protocol. The
Protocol sets a series of targets for the reduction of
emissions of greenhouse gases1 (GHG) for so-called
Annex 1 countries, i.e. the (industrialised) countries
that have emissions targets under theUnitedNations
Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC). The targets can be achieved not only
through reducing emissions in thehome country but
also through obtaining “Kyoto units”, denominated
in tons ofCO2 equivalent (tCO2-e).There are various
mechanisms that allow countries tomeet their target
requirements by obtainingKyoto units arising from
emissions reductions made in other countries (see
Yamin, this Bulletin, for an overview of the climate
regime).Oneof thesemechanisms is theCDM, which
is specifically designed to promote GHG reduction
projects in developing countries. It has been
summarised as follows:
An investor from an industrialised country or an
industrialised country government, can invest
in,or provide finance for, aproject in adeveloping
country that reduces greenhouse gas emissions
so that they are lower than what would havebeen
without the extra investment – i.e. compared to
what would have happened without the CDM
under a business as usual outcome. The
investment then gets credits – carbon credits –
for the reductions and can use these credits to
meet their Kyoto target. (CDMWatch 2003: 8)
Investments in projects that are approved and
certified as providing additional reductions ofGHG
emissions generate certificates of emission reduction
(CERs), which can be used by Annex 1 countries
as a contribution to meeting their emission
reduction targets.The scheme is intended to benefit
the Annex 1 Parties by allowing them to find the
most cost-effective projects for reducing greenhouse
gas emissions, even if these are not located within
the Annex 1 countries. The scheme is intended to
attract private sector involvement, either through
investment aimed at generating saleable CERs, or
through the purchase of theseCERs by companies
that have their own emissions obligations.2
At the same time, the scheme is intended to
provide specific benefits for developing countries
by, first, involving them in emissions reduction
activities and, second, promoting sustainable
development. For the host (developing) countries,
the CDM is expected to provide some of the
following: transfer of clean technology, foreign direct
investment in emission reduction projects, localised
environmental improvement and an income stream
from the sale ofCERs.The precise benefits will vary
from project to project, but the mechanism is
specifically set up with development objectives in
mind and host country governments have to
confirm the development effects of proposed
projects.
The development of theCDM is at an early stage
and although various projects havebeen put forward
for appraisal, none has been formally registered or
implemented. At the same time, there are
considerable uncertainties about how the
mechanism will operate in practice and what will
happen after the end of the first commitment period
under theKyoto protocol in 2012. In this context,
analysis of the CDM and its impact on developing
countries have been focused on issues such as the
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level of likely investment in CDM projects, the
supply and demand factors that will influence the
market price of a unit of emissions reduction
(usually measured as tons of CO2 equivalent per
annum, tCO2-e) and the developmental impact of
different types of CDM project (particularly
contrasting the difference between renewable energy
projects, fuel switching projects and
methane/fluorine gas reduction projects).3 There
has also been considerable discussion of the
questions of establishing baseline emission levels
and additionality so that CERs arise from genuine
reductions in GHGs.
This article focuses on the development question
and in particular how market structures can impact
on the level of benefits to developing countries from
the CDM. It analyses this question from the
perspective of global value chains. This pays
particular attention to the way in which sequences
of activities are bundled within enterprise
boundaries, or split across them and the different
ways in which activities are coordinated across firm
boundaries. In particular, it draws attention to the
different ways in which inter-firm coordination
takes place within the global economy, going beyond
the dichotomy between the vertically integrated
firms and arm’s-length market relationships and
also emphasising the importance of institutions
and standards in structuring inter-firm
relationships.4
The benefits to developing countries will depend
not only on the overall level of investments, but
also on the nature of the projects and the extent to
which they generate spillovers and learning in
developing countries. These will be affected by the
market structures that arise in response to theCDM
and its governance requirements.
2 Projects and project governance
in the CDM
The CDM can be characterised as a sequence of
economic activities – projects and the economic
benefits that flow from them – and a set of
governance procedures that define what projects
are suitable for theCDMand then validate, register
and monitor their operation prior to the emission
of tradeable CERs.
Theeconomicactivities canbe split into four stages:
1. The design of CDM projects in developing
countries.
2. The implementation of these projects, resulting
in investment and technology transfer to
developing countries.
3. The operation of these projects, reducing
greenhouse gas emissions and leading to the
emission of CERs.
4. The sale and trade ofCERs, leading to an income
stream, captured by one or more of the parties
to the project and amarket for CERs.
At the same time, these activities are subject to
governance mechanisms established by the Kyoto
protocol and institutions designed to put it in
practice:
1. All projects begin with a proposal set out in the
project design document (PDD) which has to
be approved by both the host country
government through its “designated national
authority” (DNA) and by the home country
(originator of the investment) government, and
then put out for public comment by interested
parties.
2. The emissions reduction planned to arise from
the project has to be validated by a “designated
operational entity” (DOE1) accredited by the
CDM Executive Board.
3. Registration of the project with the CDM
Executive Board. The Board is responsible for
establishing baselines and monitoring
methodologies.
4. Monitoring and verification of actual
performance of the project by a second and
separate designated operational entity (DOE2).
This DOEplays a similar role to accreditedbodies
that certified compliance with international
standards such as ISO 9000.
5. Issuing of CERs by the CDM Executive Board.
These governance mechanisms are designed to
ensure that projects result in genuine emissions of
GHGs below that which would otherwise have
occurred.They also establish transparency through
mechanisms such as the publication of PDDs,
requirements for public comment, and the
webcasting of Executive Board meetings.
3 Market structures issues
The impact of the CDM will be influenced by the
market structures that arise in response to the
economic opportunities it creates and governance
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mechanisms that are put in place. The question of
markets arises in relation not only to how CERs are
traded, but also to the way projects are financed,
designed, constructed, operated and certified.
3.1 Bundling and splitting of activities
Two of the potential benefits of the CDM are
increased investment in developing countries and
the transfer of clean technologies. It seems to be
easily assumed that the mechanism for this would
be foreign direct investment (FDI) by Annex 1
countries (see, e.g. Ellis et al. 2004: 15). Firms will
make investments in projects that lead to emission
reductions and in the course of creating the project
(for example, a power plant using renewable fuel),
technology will be transferred. Implicitly, this
assumes that the investor and the technology
provider are the same firm and that they may also
be involved in the construction operation of the
project. In fact, there is no reason to suppose this.
The company owning the relevant technology may
be a specialist technology company that might be
hired by various contractors and/or project
promoters. Similarly, the finance for the project
could be separated from the construction and the
operation and might not be channelled through
foreign companies at all.
Such separationmight be desirable. First, there
is a global tendency towards the decomposition of
innovation, with an increasing growth of specialist
technology suppliers. The benefits to developing
countries, particularly in the area of technology
acquisition,might be best served by local companies
working with these technology specialists. This
would imply partnerships between developed and
developing country firms: e.g. between clean
technology specialists in developed countries and
construction companies or energy companies in
developing countries.
In the longer term, this could bemore beneficial
for developing technological capabilities in the area
of clean technologies. Lall (2002: 52–3) argues
strongly that while FDI transfers the results of
research and development to host countries, it does
not transfer the process of technology development
and it does not build local capabilities so effectively.
For these reasons, joint ventures with specialist
technology suppliers might provide a better route
to generating developing country capabilities in
this field. These capabilities could be combined
with local-owned, export-oriented construction
businesses that exist in countries such as Brazil.
The full utilisation of these capabilities might then
depend upon the growthofCDMprojects involving
investment financed from within anAnnex 1 country
or investment directly fromonenon-Annex 1 country
to another.Far from limiting technology transfer (as
suggestedby Ellis et al.2004:11), this could stimulate
the development of developing country capabilities.
Suggestions for so-called “unilateral-CDM” and
South/SouthCDMprojects have been the subject of
debate in thedesignphase of the climatenegotiations.
Inparticular, there are concerns that thedevelopment
of such projects (and the revenues they generate)
would undermine incentives for developing countries
to assume emissions targets at some later date. As
the implementation of CDM proceeds, the issue of
the positive developmental impact of such projects
may need to be assessed and weighed against their
long-termenvironmental impact.The real challenge
may be to find ways of safeguarding the
environmental aims of the CDM while at the same
time enabling developing countries to develop
capabilities in this area.
3.2 Transactions costs and intermediaries
The transaction costs involved in the development
ofCDM projects take at least two forms. First, there
are the costs arising from the governance
mechanisms outlined above. It has been argued
that these will be substantial and ‘constitute a big
barrier to developing CDM projects’ (Ellis et al.
2004: 30). Second, there are the costs of finding
projects andpartners and working in new countries.
What strategies will be used to reduce these costs
and what will be their implications for the bundling
and splitting of activities and the emergence of
specialist firms?
It may well be easy to develop well-functioning
markets for the outcomes of CDM projects, the
tradeable CERs and here, the main challenges are
to create a supply and demand for market liquidity
and to remove uncertainties about the likely value
of these certificates. With regard to the role of
markets in bringing together the different agents
involved in the development, construction and
operation of projects, the challenges are different.
Four problems will emerge:
1. Given the level and complexity of the inter-firm
coordination required for one-off, complex
projects, the range of issues generated by the
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CDM governance mechanisms and the longer
time periods involved, specialist intermediaries
may well emerge to facilitate and/or coordinate
relationships between the different parties and
with the CDM governance mechanisms. These
intermediaries can gain economies of scale and
learning through the development of multiple
projects. They might well specialise in working
with particular DOEs and governments and with
the Executive Board. Given the advantage that
the specialist intermediaries will have over
companies working on single projects, they will
be able to obtain a significant share of the rents
from CDM projects. What strategies are there
for promoting the growth of developing country
intermediaries that canmanage the system and
bring together different actors effectively,
ensuring an increased flow of projects and also
retaining the benefits (income streams and
technology acquisition) in the host countries?
2. The high fixed costs associated with complying
with CDM regulations may undermine the
development of small-scale projects.What can
be done to reduce costs beyond the simplified
procedures already in place?
3. The costs of working with host country
governments, DOEs and specialist intermediaries
may strongly favour the concentration of projects
in a small number of countries. This
concentration is already evident, with 55 per
cent of the expected emissions reductions from
137 CDM projects coming from just four large
developing countries (Brazil, China, India and
Indonesia) (Ellis et al. 2004: 18–19). To what
extent should multilateral agencies and
government-funded schemes for promoting
CDM projects focus on increasing the spread of
projects? The World Bank’s Prototype Carbon
Fund (PCF), for example, allocates funds by
region, as well as by type of project (deConinck
and van der Linden 2003: 9). The option of
regional quotas for investment in order to ensure
that the poorest countries are not excluded from
the potential benefits of the CDM is suggested
by Panayotou (1998: 46). Alternatively, some
consideration could be given to resurrecting the
“portfolio approach” to the CDM, as discussed
by Yamin (1998: 54–6). This approach would
have channelled investment through the CDM
itself, rather than leading project development
to direct relationships between the parties.
4. Finally, the transactions costs involved in
developing new projects may work against the
goal of additionality. It only becomes worth
incurring the extra costs if much of the work for
the project would have been done anyway. In
effect, the revenue stream from the CERs
generated only has to cover the costs ofmeeting
the CDM governance requirements. Critiques
of the projects financed by the first round of the
Dutch-fundedCERUPT programme argue that
much of the finance is going to projects such as
fuel substitution and hydroelectricity that would
have taken place anyway.5 This may indicate a
lack of suitable alternative projects, rather than
a failure of the programme to recognise the
additionality issue.
3.3 Validation and monitoring/ verification
The role of the designated operational entities
(DOEs) responsible for validation of project designs
and the monitoring/verification of emissions
reduction is critical in the governance of theCDM
and this work is likely to generate substantial
revenues. Experience with global governance in
the field of quality standards, notably ISO 9000,
indicates that this work is likely to be dominated
by international firms who can offer a service to
potential investors covering a range of countries
and also provide credible certification. This tends
to decrease the transaction costs of schemes by
allowing companies to work with a single service
provider (although local subsidiaries or franchises
may carry out the work).
This work itself generates competences that can
be applied more widely in the economy. Although
the CDM separates the roles of validation and
verification for each project, these competences
will be contained within particular service providers
and can be used to support capability acquisition
by local firms. It is, therefore, reasonable to ask
whether the procedures adopted by theCDM favour
the relatively few transnational business service
companies that are so important in other areas of
international certification and what might be done
to promote participation in this business by
developing country firms. There would be direct
benefits from employment in revenues generated
and also greater potential spillovers to investors
and operating companies in developing countries.
Although the International Organisation for
Standardisation (ISO) has become active in climate
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negotiations in recent years in explaining its work,
many climate policy makers do not fully understand
how quality standards work, particularly in
developing countries.
3.4 Orient project towards development
Even in the initial stages of CDM project
preparation, it is evident that there are trade-offs
between profit maximisation by investors and the
sustainable development objectives of the CDM.
The latter are most likely to be achieved through
projects such as renewable energy schemes and
such schemes would also contribute to the financing
of necessary energy infrastructure investments in
developing countries (see also Leach and Leach,
this Bulletin). In contrast, large potential generators
ofCERs, such as flurianted gases reduction projects,
have no broader developmental impact, but these
projects provide the lowest-cost means of generating
Kyoto units.
Host country governments, in particular the
governments of small countries,may have little to
bargain with in this area, particularly because the
global scope of the CDM means project investors
have a wide choice of location. Therefore, extra
means are needed to increase the developmental
impact of CDM projects. The first is on the supply
side. Home country governments could prioritise
projects with a strong development element. This
can be done through the criteria for allocating
investment finance. Alternatively, there could be
means of certifying investment funds as
“development friendly”. Second, there is a potential
demand-side approach. It may be possible to
differentiate, or “brand”, particular types of CDM
projects (or, more specifically, the CERs that they
generate) as being of greater value because they
have greater developmental impact. Particular
companies are already doing this. However, on a
project basis, this ties the increased “value” of the
project to the particular investor or operator. The
costs of doing this would be reduced if some form
of global standard for a “fair CDM” label could be
developed. While this would involve costs – the
costs of developing the criteria, the costs of certifying
compliance, sanctioning non-compliance and
controlling the use of the standard (label, etc.) – it
would be less expensive than developing private
labels for each project or company. A further step
in this direction would be to separate the project
from the indicator of increased value by creating
certificates that could be traded independently.This
type of scheme is used with “green certificates” for
renewable energy in Europe (Kooijman-van Dijk
2003). This would allow many different agents to
support such projects by purchasing such
certificates, or paying increased prices for products
associated with them (and thereby giving value to
the certificate) without having to be directly involved
in the projects themselves.
4 Conclusions
Uncertainties about the entry into force and future
evolution of the Kyoto Protocol are undoubtedly
having a depressive effect on the level of CDM
activity. But at the same time, the pace of CDM
project planning is picking up as confidence grows
in the interim arrangement for the CDMs, which
will continue to function under the legal authority
of the UNFCCC. Now that the international
governance structures of theCDM are more or less
settled, the coming period provides an important
opportunity for a more grounded examination of
the likely impacts of emergent market structures on
the level of benefits to developing countries. The
early phase of theCDM will be amixture of learning
and jockeying for position as countries, firms and
other actors work out how to make the most of
opportunities presented. Policy makers have often
complained about frenetic pace and complexity of
climate negotiations, particularly on theCDM.The
relative lull in the international negotiations provides
a timely opportunity for researchers and policy
makers, particularly from developing countries, to
examine some of the issues and questions raised in
this article to ensure the new carbon markets
generate as high a level of developmental benefits
as possible for developing countries.
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Notes
* The author is particularly grateful to Farhana Yamin for
stimulating the writing of this article and providing
valuable support and advice on the subject matter.
1. The greenhouse gases (GHGs) covered by the protocol
are carbon dioxide (CO2),methane (CH4), nitrous oxide
(N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons
(PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).
2. Although emissions reductions targets and obligations
are placed on nation states, governments can transfer
some of the onus for meeting them onto private
companies. The UK government emissions trading
scheme, for example, provides incentives for private
sector companies to undertake voluntary, but legally
bindingClimateChangeAgreements which could bemet
through emissions trading. (See www.defra.gov.uk/
environment/climatechange/trading/ukets.htm)
3. See, for example, Haites (2004), CDMWatch (2003) and
Ellis et al. (2004).
4. For a set of papers outlining this approach, see Gereffi
and Kaplinski (2001).More recent papers can be found
at the website of the global value chains initiative,
www.ids.ac.uk/globalvaluechains/index.html.
5. See CDMWatch (2004) and the International Rivers
Network (2004).
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